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GIVING VOICE TO THE PRECARIOUSLY 
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Most contemporary occupational health and safety (OHS) regimes 
incorporate some arrangement to facilitate worker voice. This policy is 
based on a belief that worker voice desirable for two reasons. First, there is 
a normative argument that the people who bear the risk of being injured, 
made ill or dying from unsafe and unhealthy work ought to have a say about 
the regulation of hazardous working conditions. This moral intuition led 
James Ham to assert in his influential Report of the Royal Commission on 
the Health and Safety of Workers in Mines that “the employee has the 
legitimate right, under the principle of natural justice, to appraise the 
conditions under which he works and to express his views on their 
adequacy.”1 Second, there is a positive claim, well supported by empirical 
research, that OHS systems providing for worker voice produce better 
outcomes than those that do not.2
1 Ham, J. 1976. “Report of the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of 
Workers in Mines,” Ministry of the Attorney General, 146. 
 In an ideal world, a policy that is 
normatively appealing and would improve OHS outcomes would be widely 
embraced. But this was not the case for worker voice in OHS. Workers had 
to struggle to obtain voice rights and the extent of those rights tended to 
reflect the strength of worker mobilization and bargaining and political 
power.  
2 Nichols, T., and D. Walters. 2007. Worker Representation and Workplace Health 
and Safety. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
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Given the timing of the struggle in the late-1960s, and its location 
principally in mines and factories,3
I begin this chapter by briefly describing the contours of the changing 
labour market and the vulnerabilities it is producing. Following that, I 
describe some earlier mapping models of OHS regulation that incorporated 
worker participation as a critical dimension, but that did not try to identify 
the channels in which worker voice might be exercised. I then produce a 
map of those channels, based on three variables: the subject of worker 
voice, the object of worker voice and the audience for worker voice. The 
chapter then discusses existing laws facilitating and protecting worker 
voice, paying particular attention to the problems that arise when they are 
applied to precarious workers. It concludes by considering recent 
developments that may point the way toward new strategies and tactics for 
amplifying worker voice in the context of today’s labour market. Although 
my central case is Ontario, Canada, I draw on a broader literature that 
indicates the problems experienced here are representative of a more 
general phenomenon. 
 it is not surprising that policy-makers 
and worker advocates designed worker voice mechanisms on the 
assumption that their target population was comprised of full-time workers 
having more or less secure jobs with their current employers. This is 
manifestly no longer true posing a serious challenge to the efficacy of the 
ways worker voice has been institutionalized and the OHS regimes that 
assume worker voice is working.  The purpose of this chapter is to explore 
this challenge and to examine various initiatives that have been suggested to 
meet it.  
2. Growing Labour Market Insecurity
There is now a large body of research that clearly demonstrates the 
growth of labour market insecurity in the late-twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries. The basic contours of the story are well known.4
3 MacDowell, L. S. 2012. “The Elliot Lake Uranium Miners’ Battle to Gain 
Occupational Health and Safety Improvements, 1950-1980,” Labour/Le Travail 
69:91-118; Storey, R. 2005. “Activism and the Making of Occupational Health and 
Safety Law in Ontario, 1960s-1980” Policy and Practice in Health and Safety 3:41-
68. 
 In the 
4 The literature is vast. For a small sample, see: Lewchuk, W., M. Clarke and A. de 
Wolff. 2011. Working Without Commitments. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press; Standing, G. 2011. The Precariat. London: Bloomsbury 
Eric Tucker 3 
aftermath of World War II workers in most western industrial capitalist 
democracies influenced their national governments to adopt Keynesian and 
social-democratic policies that partially decommodified labour power. 
Welfare-state provisions loosened worker dependence on labour markets 
and, in response, employers in core economic sectors made commitments to 
employees that went beyond their short-term economic interests. Workers in 
these sectors could expect to be hired into full-time jobs that would continue 
until retirement except for economic or disciplinary reasons, and that lay-
offs would be governed by notice, seniority and due process protections. 
Employer-provided pensions and other benefits were also normally part of 
the compensation package. Many of these workers were unionized, but even 
those who were not enjoyed forms of security comparable to unionized 
firms as a union avoidance strategy.5
Since the early 1970s employers have been retreating from the SER 
which came to be viewed as a barrier to renewed profitability.
 These kinds of arrangements have 
been appropriately labeled as the standard employment relationship (SER). 
6
Academic; Vosko, L. 2010. Managing the Margins. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; and Vosko, L. ed. 2006. Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour 
Market Insecurity in Canada. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press. 
 In part, this 
was accomplished by changing the form of work contract, evidenced by the 
growth of part-time, temporary and self employment. As well, employers 
increasingly obtained labour from temporary employment agencies through 
leasing arrangements that produced a tripartite relationship in which legal 
responsibility for complying with labor and employment law was divided 
between the agency and the client. Of course, this has not been the fate of 
all workers, but even for those with full-time permanent jobs, labour market 
insecurity was increased by downsizing, outsourcing and contracting out 
into domestic or global supply chains.  As a result, many workers faced the 
risk that their present job might end and that the jobs they might get in the 
future would be more demanding, less secure, and lower paid. Finally, there 
has been a substantial increase in temporary foreign worker programs that 
enable Canadian to more easily access global labour markets.  The workers 
in the lower skill categories are particularly vulnerable because their 
5 Storey, R. 1983. “Unionization versus Corporate Welfare: The Dofasco Way,” 
Labour/Le Travail 12, 7-42. 
6 Again, the literature is vast. A few key works include: Kotz, D. M., T. McDonagh., 
and M. Reich. eds. 2010. Contemporary Capitalism and its Crises. New York: 
Cambridge University Press; and Harvey, D. 2005. A Brief History of Neo-
Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
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immigration status is tied to an employment contract with a particular 
employer.7 In short, labour market insecurity was manufactured to create a 
social structure of accumulation that permitted the owners of capital to 
extract a greater share of socially produced wealth for their benefit by 
reducing their commitments to workers.8
At the same time, employers also pressed government to abandon the 
Keynesian and social-democratic policy prescriptions. Internationally, this 
included entering into free-trade agreements that facilitated the 
globalization of production, while domestically cutting welfare spending 
and pursuing labour market policies and laws that facilitated flexible work 
arrangements to meet employers’ requirements, reducing the floor of 
minimum standards and weakening collective bargaining laws. As well, 
governments were also pressed to reduce the public sector, often through 
privatization often entailed substituting lower paying and less secure private 
sector jobs for the unionized public sectors jobs they replaced. Finally, 
remaining public sector jobs were subject to private sector management 
techniques aimed at increasing productivity and reducing labour costs.
 
9
The implications of these changes of OHS have been well documented 
elsewhere.
As a 
result, public sectors jobs also became less secure.  
10
7 Sargeant, M., and E. Tucker. 2010. “Layers of Vulnerability in Occupational 
Health and Safety for Migrant Workers: Case Studies from Canada and the UK, 
Policy and Practice,” Occupational Health and Safety 7, No. 2:51-73; Fudge, J., and 
F. MacPhail. 2009. “The Temporary Foreign Worker Program in Canada: Low-
Skilled Workers as an Extreme Form of Flexible Labour,” Comparative Labor Law 
and Policy Journal 31, No. 1:5-46. 
 The focus here is on their impact on worker voice in OHS 
regulation. 
8 Bieler, A. 2012. “Neo-liberal Globalisation, the Manufacturing of Insecurity and 
the Power of Labour,” Labor History 53, No. 2:274-79. 
9 Huws, U. 2012. “Crisis as Capitalist Opportunity: The New Accumulation through 
Public Service Commodification,” Socialist Register 2012: The Crisis and the Left 
48, 64-84. 
10 For example, see: Quinlan, M. 1999. “The Implications of Labour Market 
Restructuring in Industrialized Societies for Occupational Health and Safety,” 
Economic and Industrial Democracy 20, No. 3:427-60; Bohle, P., and M. 
Quinlan.2008. “Under Pressure, Out of Control, or Home Alone? Reviewing 
Research and Policy Debates on the Occupational Health and Safety Effects of 
Outsourcing and Home-Based Work,” International Journal of Health Services 38, 
No. 3:489-523; and Quinlan, M., and E. Underhill. 2011. “How Precarious 
Employment Affects Health and Safety at Work: The Case of Temporary Foreign 
Workers,” Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations 66, No. 3:397-421. 
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3. Mapping Worker Voice in OHS Regulation
In previous work I mapped different ways in which workers could be 
written into OHS regimes based on the relative strength of worker 
participation and direct state protection. My aim was to describe worker the 
variety OHS citizenship regimes rights in industrial capitalist states.  That 
matrix can readily be adapted to describe models of OHS regulation, as I 
have done below in Fig.2-1.  
Fig. 2-1. Models of OHS Regulation 
These models are not just ideal types, but accurately describe different 
approaches to OHS regulation, and can be used to map the historical 
trajectory of OHS regulation within a particular jurisdiction and well as to 
compare regimes in different jurisdictions.11
11 Tucker, E. 2007. “Remapping Worker Citizenship Regimes in Contemporary 
Health and Safety Regulation,” International Journal of Health Services 31, No. 
1:145-70; Tucker, E. 2003. “The Politics of Occupational Health and Safety in a 
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For example, the historical development of OHS regulation in Ontario, 
Canada begins in the mid-nineteenth century when railway and industrial 
workers sued their employers for compensation as a result of work related 
injuries.  Courts faced with these suits adopted the common law to support a 
regime of market regulation, by insisting that OHS conditions were to be 
determined by the contract of employment and not the imposition of legal 
standards.  Freedom of contract was to prevail.    
The reality for most workers, whether they were children, women or 
men, was that they could not meaningfully exercise voice in the labour 
market by negotiating with their employers over hazardous conditions.  The 
market was neither free nor fair.  Worker dissatisfaction gained political 
traction and this led to the enactment of work safety legislation in the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century. The enforcement of these safety 
laws, however, was problematic and the result was a weakly enforced 
regime of direct state regulation that did not produce levels of safety 
significantly better than the market.  Notwithstanding its deficiencies, this 
regime was subsequently stabilized by the enactment of no-fault workers’ 
compensation in the first decades of the twentieth century. Not only did 
workers’ compensation provide financial relief to injured workers and their 
families, but it probably increased the cost of accidents to employers and 
prompted employers and employer associations to invest in safety 
improvements. Worker voice, however, remained muted. Individual 
workers may have acted as informants for inspectors and unions 
participated in lobbying efforts to strengthen OHS and workers’ 
compensation laws, but in an era when unionization rates in most industries 
were low, union influence was limited. 
After World War II, as part of the embrace of Keynesianism and social 
democracy, union density increased and some unions became more active in 
OHS issues. Some collective agreements required a joint health and safety 
committee (JHSC) and, more generally, arbitrators found that workers had a 
right to refuse unsafe work without being disciplined for insubordination. 
This produced a regime of industrial pluralist regulation for a segment of 
the labour force covered by collective agreements..  
Finally, in the last decades of the twentieth century, a new wave of 
legislation was enacted giving all workers participatory rights and 
strengthening direct state regulation, particularly with respect to 
occupational health hazards. These developments moved Ontario in the 
                                                                                                                     
Cold Climate: Diverging Trends in Worker Protection and Participation in Canada, 





direction of social democratic regulation, although of a relatively weak 
kind.12
So while the conceptual map was useful for historical and comparative 
analysis of OHS regimes, like all models it contains certain limitations that 
have become more apparent in the course of exploring new channels of 
voice for precarious workers.  First, the model assumes that the space for 
worker voice is in the employer’s management system.  It does not 
contemplate worker participation in the enforcement system.  Second, it 
assumes that worker voice will be exercised collectively.  These limitations 
were understandable at the time. Health and safety activists and others were 
engaged in a political project to enhance collective worker voice at the point 
of production, the more radical among them arguing that worker control 
should be the goal.
 At the time, it was the enhancement of worker voice that was seen as 
the greatest innovation.  
13
In order to broaden the discussion, here I map the channels of worker 
voice based on three variables: subject, object and audience. The subject of 
voice refers to whether we are concerned with individual or collective 
worker voice. Regulatory regimes in OHS typically provide for both, 
although in varying degrees. The second variable is the object of voice, 
which refers to whether worker voice is directed at correcting hazardous 
conditions in the workplace, whether or not they violate the law, or 
reforming the laws and policies that determine what practices are legal or 
accepted by the employer```. The third dimension is the audience. Here the 
question is whether worker voice is directed at the employer or at the state, 
opening up for discussion the role of worker voice in direct state regulation. 
The combination of these three variables produces Table 2-1. 
 However, this political project may have reached its 
limits, especially in the new world of work where worker voice in the 
workplace is losing strength, making it necessary to explore whether 
alternative channels for voice, including voice in public enforcement, 
provide greater opportunities for improving worker safety. 
 
 
                                                        
12 Tucker, E. Remapping Worker Citizenship Regimes in Contemporary Health and 
Safety Regulation, cit. Also see: Tucker, E. 1990. Administering Danger: The Law 
and Politics of Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in Ontario, 1850-1914. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press; and Tucker, E. 1992. “Worker Participation in 
Health and Safety Regulation: Lessons from Sweden,” Studies in Political Economy 
37:95-127. 
13 Poole, M. 1986. Towards  a New Industrial Democracy. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
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While some of these channels are largely theoretical possibilities, most exist 
in practice.  In what follows, I discuss each channel of worker voice, 
including its legal entrenchment, its use by “standard” workers and its use 
by precarious or vulnerable workers. 
 
 
4. Exploring Channels of Worker Voice 
 
4.1. Individual Worker Voice—Hazardous Conditions 
 
Beginning from the left, I start with individual voice raising concerns 
about hazardous working conditions directly with the employer. By law, 
individual workers have a right, indeed perhaps a duty, to raise concerns 
about hazardous workplace conditions with their employer. For example, 
under Ontario’s Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA), ss. 28(1)(c) 
and (d) impose a duty on workers to report to an employer or a supervisor 
defects in any equipment or protective devices or contraventions of the Act 
and Regulations.14 There is also a legally protected right to refuse unsafe 
work when the worker has reason to believe that the equipment, a physical 
condition or workplace violence is likely to endanger the worker or another 
person. Workers are required to report the circumstances of the refusal to a 
supervisor and the employer, and employers are prohibited from retaliating 
against workers for acting in compliance with the Act or seeking its 
enforcement.15
It hardly bears repeating that this is a fundamentally important channel 
for worker voice. Workers’ eyes are often the first to see hazardous 
 
                                                        
14 Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.1.; [OHSA]. 





situations and if the employer does not adequately resolve reasonable 
worker concerns about safety, workers should have both the freedom to 
refuse unsafe work and a right not to suffer adverse consequences for doing 
so. Yet the existence of legal guarantees is only the first step for making this 
channel of voice effective. There must also be an institutional infrastructure 
in place to make these rights meaningful. Workers must not only have 
knowledge of their rights and of the hazards in their workplaces, but they 
must also feel secure that they can freely exercise voice without employer 
or co-worker retaliation.16
Garry Gray has identified three kinds of inter-related constraints on the 
individual exercise of safety rights: cultural, personal and structural.
 
17
                                                        
16 Johnstone, R., M. Quinlan., and D. Walters. 2005. “Statutory Occupational Health 
and Safety Workplace Arrangements for the Modern Labour Market,” Journal of 
Industrial Relations 47, No. 1:93-116.  
 
Cultural constraints refer to the prevailing set of attitudes, beliefs, symbols, 
practices and behaviours in local work settings that may discourage 
individual workers from reporting hazards or refusing unsafe work. For 
example, if the prevalent view of management is that individual workers 
should be responsible for avoiding risks that are present, rather than it being 
the responsibility of the management to remove those risks, then workers 
are more likely to feel reluctant to report or refuse hazards situations unless 
there is substantial co-worker support. Personal constraints refer to 
individual circumstances that may weaken a worker’s ability or willingness 
to exercise safety rights. For example, workers will be more or less 
knowledgeable about safety risks. They will also be more or less willing to 
tolerate confrontation depending both on their personal characteristics and 
on their security at work, which in turn may depend on their place in the 
workplace hierarchy and their level of job security. Finally, structural 
constraints refer to the unequal power relations within work places that 
often make workers reluctant to challenge their employers’ authority 
regardless of their legal rights. The greater the inequality, the more 
constrained workers are likely to be in acting as protagonists in defense of 
their own health and safety. Moreover, the structural constraints are also 
17Gray, G. C. 2011. “Constraints to Upholding Workplace Safety Laws and 
Regulations within Organizations,” Droit et Société 77, No. 1:57-68. Also see: 
Feldman, Y., and O. Lobel. 2011. “Individuals as Enforcers: The Design of 
Employee Reporting Systems,” in Explaining Compliance, eds. Parker, C., and V. 
Lehmann Nielsen., (UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, Cheltenham), 263-
84. 
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likely to shape the cultural and personal factors influencing individual 
exercises of worker rights. 
In the face of these constraints, it is not surprising that a growing body 
of research is finding that even among workers in a SER the voice channels 
of hazard reporting and, even more so, of work refusals are obstructed. 
Beginning with hazard reporting, Gray’s ethnographic study of workers in 
an Ontario factory reported they were often silent about recognized hazards 
in their workplace.18 Two other surveys also found significant worker 
reluctance to report. The first, a survey of unionized workers in south 
western Ontario, found that close to one-half did not report a significant 
hazard and one-third expressed concerns that reporting hazards or injuries 
would negatively affect their future employment.19 This result was 
confirmed by a second survey of Ontario workers in the Toronto-Hamilton 
corridor. It found that about one-third of respondents reported that raising a 
health and safety issue at work would negatively affect future 
employment.20
When we turn to the question of work refusals, which of course entails 
going beyond reporting and defying the employer who still requires the 
work to be done, it is expected that workers will be more reluctant to 
exercise voice, notwithstanding legal guarantees against retaliation.  
Research confirms this expectation even among workers in an SER. As with 
 The study also reported that when responses were 
disaggregated between workers who reported that they were exposed to 
hazardous conditions and those who were not, close to two-thirds of those 
who were exposed to hazards reported that raising concerns would 
negatively affect their future employment. Presumably this discrepancy is 
explained by the fact that workers who are actually exposed to hazardous 
working conditions thought more concretely about the consequences of 
reporting than those who were not.  
                                                        
18 Gray, G. C. 2002. “A Socio-Legal Ethnography of the Right to Refuse Dangerous 
Work,” Studies in Law, Politics and Society 24, No. 2:133-69. 
19 Hall, A. 2010. “To Report or Not to Report Injuries: Worker Rationales and 
Workplace Constraints,” Paper presented at the LOARC Teach-in, Internal 
Responsibility Thirty Years Later: Not Yet Healthy and Still Not Safe, McMaster 
University, Hamilton, Ontario, May 2010; Hall, A., and S.S. Phillips. 2011. “Injury 
and Hazard Reporting in the Context of Precarious Employment,” Paper presented at 
the Canadian Sociological Association Meeting, St. Thomas University/University 
of New Brunswick, New Brunswick, May 2011. 
20 Lewchuk, W. “The Limits of Voice: Who is Afraid of their Health and Safety 
Rights?,” Paper presented at the Voice at Work North American Meeting, Osgoode 





reporting, the right to refuse will only be exercised when there are 
institutional arrangements in place to support its exercise. In Ontario, the 
overwhelming majority of work refusals are by unionized workers who 
have the security of a collective agreement that provides them with 
protection against arbitrary discharge and discipline and the support of a 
union that has the resources to bring a grievance or a labour board 
complaint on their behalf.21 Yet unionization alone is not enough to provide 
workers with security. When complaints about retaliation are made, labour 
boards and arbitrators have tended to interpret narrowly the scope of the 
right to refuse work as subordinate to the employers’ right to manage. As a 
result, workers may find it difficult to vindicate their legal rights.  Even 
with the support of their unions. But other structural constraints may be 
even more powerful. Unionized workers are not immune from economic 
lay-offs or plant closings so that during periods of economic contraction 
workers may be extremely reluctant to engage in militant or disruptive 
behaviour and may find little support from their co-workers, even if the 
circumstances warrant a legal work refusal.22
To this point, our discussion of reporting and refusing hazards by 
individual workers to the employer has focused on workers in SERs. That 
is, we have focused on the kind of workers who were in the contemplation 
of policy makers when these rights were enacted in the 1970s. Yet from the 
beginning commentators noted the limits of worker voice in the internal 
responsibility or safety management systems that were being constructed to 
comply with the law and since that time the structural constraints under 
 
                                                        
21 Tucker, E. 1986. “The Persistence of Market Regulation of Occupational Health 
and Safety: The Stillbirth of Voluntarism,” in Essays in Labour Relations Law, ed. 
England, G., (Don Mills, ON: CCH) 219-262; O’Grady, J. 2000. “Joint Health and 
Safety Committees: Finding a Balance,” in Injury and the New World of Work, ed. 
Sullivan, T., (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press) 162-97. 
22 Harcourt, M., and S. Harcourt. 2000. “When Can an Employee Refuse Unsafe 
Work and Expect to be Protected from Discipline? Evidence from Canada,” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 55, No. 4:684-703; Renaud, M., and C. St.-
Jacques. 1988. “The Right to Refuse in Quebec: Five Year Evolution of a New 
Mode of Expressing Risk,” International Journal of Health Services 18, No. 3:401-
17; Walters, V. et al. 1995. “Judgments of Legitimacy regarding Occupational 
Health and Safety: A Report on a Canadian Study” in Corporate Crime: 
Contemporary Debates, Pearce, F., and L. Snider, (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press) 284-301; Gray, G. C. Ethnography, cit. The precipitous decline in strike rates 
in most advanced capitalist economies further attests to this phenomenon. See: 
Dribbusch, H., D. Lyddon, K.I. Vandaele, and S. Van der Velden, eds., 2007. Strikes 
Around the World, 1968-2005. Amsterdam: Aksant. 
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which those systems operate have tended to undermine the conditions for 
effective worker voice generally.23
It is not surprising, therefore, that when we examine the individual voice 
channel for precarious workers a small but growing body of research has 
found that it is unlikely to be effective. First, a prerequisite for reporting or 
refusing is that the worker is aware of the hazard. Temporary workers, 
contract workers or self-employed workers whose tenure at any particular 
work location is liable to be short are less likely to have an opportunity to 
gain local knowledge about the particular hazards in their present worksites 
and many employers will not be inclined to invest adequately in training to 
provide it directly. For example, Aronsson’s study of contingent workers in 
Sweden found that non-permanent workers more frequently reported feeling 
they lacked sufficient work-environment knowledge and training than 
permanent workers and that their non-permanent status made it more 
difficult for them to raise concerns and get their viewpoint heard.
 
24
Second, almost by definition, precarious workers are less secure than 
those in an SER. As a result, their perceived cost of exercising OHS rights 
is likely to be higher, reducing the likelihood they will do so. Lewchuk’s 
study, referred to earlier, found that workers with only moderate security 
were more than twice as likely as workers with high security to express the 
fear that reporting an OHS concern would negatively impact future 
employment, while workers in the high precarity category were seven times 
more likely to express this fear.
 
25
If precarious workers are less able to recognize hazards and are more 
fearful that raising OHS concerns will negatively impact future 
employment, then we can also safely assume that work refusals will be rare 
indeed. To my knowledge, however, there are no empirical studies that have 
specifically examined work refusals by precarious workers, although in 
Gray’s ethnography he reports that when he refused unsafe work 
management replaced him with a young female university student from 
another department who, as a temporary worker, presumably had less 





                                                        
23 See: Haines, T., and V. Walters. 1988. “Workers’ Use and Knowledge of the 
‘Internal Responsibility System’: Limits to Participation in Occupational Health and 
Safety,” Canadian Public Policy 14, Mo. 3:411-23.  
24 Aronsson, G. 1999. “Contingent Workers and Health and Safety,” Work, 
Employment and Society 13, No.3:439-60. 
25 Lewchuk, W. op. cit. 






4.2 Collective Workplace Voice—Hazardous Conditions 
 
Because of the deficiencies of individual voice for workers generally, let 
alone precarious workers, health and safety reforms of the 1970s and 80s 
put greater emphasis on creating institutional arrangements for collective 
worker voice to foster communication between workers and employers and 
between workers and OHS officials. Here our focus is on JHSCs and HSRs, 
beginning first with their place in the employer’s safety management 
system. 
Again, taking Ontario as our example, with some exceptions the OHSA 
currently requires the establishment of an JHSC at workplaces where twenty 
or more workers are regularly employed and the appointment of an HSR in 
a workplace with fewer than twenty but more than five regularly employed 
workers. If the workers are represented by a trade union, then the union 
appoints the HSRs or the worker representatives on JHSCs (who will also 
be called HSRs). Otherwise they are to be elected by the workers with non-
managerial functions. HSRs play a crucial role in communicating OHS 
concerns to the employer. By law, HSRs are entitled to training on paid 
work time, they are entitled to get OHS information from the employer and 
they have a duty to conduct periodic examinations of the workplace. HSRs 
can make recommendations to the employer directly, or to the JHSC, which 
then makes recommendations to the employer and the employer must 
respond in writing to these recommendations. HSRs also assist individual 
workers. For example, during a work refusal (which is an individual and not 
a group right), HSRs are to be called to participate in the internal 
investigation of the refusing worker’s concern.27
In one form or another, these arrangements exist in most advanced 
industrial economies and while differences are salient in terms of their 
effectiveness it is not my concern here to enter into that discussion.
 
28
                                                        
27OHSA, cit. ss. 8, 9 & 43(4). 
 
Rather, I want to emphasize that the common goal of these reforms was to 
require the employer to establish a participatory OHS management system 
in which worker representatives would bring worker concerns to the 
attention of the employer and be involved in their prompt and appropriate 
resolution; in short, an effective channel for collective worker voice to the 
employer.  
28 Nichols, T., and D. Walters. 2007. Worker Representation and Workplace Health 
and Safety. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
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There is now a large literature on the effectiveness of HSRs and JHSCs 
that can be briefly summarized. It is well established that merely mandating 
JHSCs and HSRs is not sufficient to create effective channels for collective 
worker voice, although a strong legislative steer is necessary. The 
effectiveness of JHSCs and HSRs depends on the presence of a number of 
other inter-related conditions including an effective system of external 
inspection and control, senior management commitment to OHS and 
participatory arrangements, worker representative access to information and 
training, and a degree of worker economic security and power.29
There is also ample, although not uncontroverted evidence that a trade 
union presence increases the effectiveness of collective worker voice in 
OHS. To the extent this is found it may be because a union presence helps 
strengthen the other conditions supporting worker voice. For example, 
unions may provide valuable OHS training and reduce the cost of obtaining 
access to information. They may also provide worker representatives with 
greater job security. Finally, in a unionized workplace the employer maybe 
more used to and accepting of participatory arrangements in relation to 
shop-floor matters like OHS. But of course, the mere presence of a union is 
no guarantee collective worker voice will be effective. Unions may not 
make OHS a priority, they certainly cannot protect the bargaining unit 
against economic lay-offs or plant shutdowns, and employers may actively 
resist union involvement in decision-making rather than accept it. Indeed, 
some recent research has found that in the face of declining union densities 
and power, and growing employer resistance to collective bargaining, the 
channels for collective worker voice, even for workers in SERs in unionized 
sectors, are becoming blocked.
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29 E.g. Walters D. and T. Nichols, op cit., 117; Liu, H., et al. 2010. “The 
Pennsylvania Certified Safety Committee Program: An Evaluation of Participation 
and Effects on Work Injury Rates,” in American Journal of Industrial Medicine 53, 
No. 8:780-91; Granzow, K., and N. Therberge. 2009. “On the Line: Worker 
Democracy and the Struggle Over Occupational Health and Safety,” Qualitative 
Health Research 19, No. 1:82-93; Eaton, A., and T. Nocerino. 2000. “The 
Effectiveness of Health and Safety Committees: Results of a Survey of Public Sector 
Workplaces,” Industrial Relations 39, No. 2:265-90. For recent reviews of the 
literature, see Carlan, N., A. Forrest, A. Hall, and A. Sears. 2006. “Making a 
Difference: Knowledge Activism and Worker Representation in Joint OHS 
Committees,” Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations 61, No. 3:408-34. 
 
30 For example, Gunningham, N. 2008. “Occupational Health and Safety, Worker 
Participation and the Mining Industry in a Changing World of Work,” Economic 





In light of these findings, it is not surprising that researchers are 
generally pessimistic about the prospect of collective workplace voice for 
precarious workers. First, there are some basic questions around how or 
whether precarious workers of various kinds even fit into the statutory 
scheme for collective representation. Some arrangements are more 
problematic than others. In respect of independent contracting, in Ontario 
and many other jurisdictions employers owe a duty to protect workers, not 
just employees, so that an employer does not avoid OHS obligations by 
having independent contractors performing work on the employer’s 
premises. Moreover, if those contractors are “regularly employed” then they 
are to be counted for the purposes of calculating whether a JHSC or an HSR 
is required.  Just recently the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the term 
“regularly employed” should be given an expansive meaning so that a 
company that dispatched owner-operators was required to have a JHSC.31
The application of the law to temporary agency workers is more 
problematic. The agency is considered the employer for the purposes of 
workers’ compensation but the client is also the employer for the purposes 
of OHSA. If temps are regularly employed by the client then they will count 
toward calculating whether an HSR or a JHSC is required, but the agency 
itself will not be required to have HSRs or a JHSC, even though it may have 
hundreds or even thousands of employees because they are not regularly 
employed at the agency’s workplace.
 
32
Beyond the question of mismatches between statutory provisions and 
precarious working arrangements lies the issue of the effectiveness of 
participatory arrangements even when they are required. As we noted, 
research has pointed to three significant factors associated with successful 
collective voice in workplace OHS: worker knowledge, worker 
 
                                                        
31 Ontario (Labour) v United Independent Operators Limited, 2011 ONCA 33, 90 
C.C.E.L. (3d) 171. 
32 For a more detailed discussions of mismatches between statutory provisions and 
labour market changes, see Lippel, K. 2006. “Precarious Employment and 
Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in Quebec,” in Precarious Employment: 
Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada, ed. Vosko, L., (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press), 241-55; Lippel, K., et al. 2001. “Legal 
Protections Governing the Occupational Safety and Health and Workers’ 
Compensation of Temporary Employment Agency Workers in Canada: Reflections 
On Regulatory Effectiveness,” Policy and Practice in Health and Safety 9, No. 2:69-
90; Johnstone, R., M. Quinlan., and D. Walters. 2005. “Statutory Occupational 
Health and Safety Workplace Arrangements for the Modern Labour Market,” 
Journal of Industrial Relations 47, No. 1:93-116. 
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empowerment and employer commitment. As we have already noted, 
researchers consistently report that precarious workers are less likely to 
have OHS knowledge and more likely to feel vulnerable to suffering 
adverse consequences for raising OHS concerns. Moreover, precarious 
workers face considerable obstacles to collective action. Not only are there 
serious questions about when so-called self-employed workers qualify as 
employees for the purposes of collective bargaining law, but other groups of 
precarious workers whose employment status is not in question encounter 
other legal problems, including the question of who is the employer for 
collective bargaining purposes.33 Of course, collective action outside the 
structure of formal unions is possible, and we will return later to discuss 
some developments in this regard, but these arrangements generally do not 
provide workers with the ability to act collectively at the workplace level. 
Finally, we might ask whether it is likely that employers who choose to 
meet their labour requirement through precarious workers will be 
committed to participatory management structures. To ask the question is to 
answer it; employers who adopt these arrangements are motivated to 
reduce, if not eliminate, commitments to workers, and so it would be 





4.3. Individual Worker Voice and the State—Hazardous 
Conditions 
 
An alternative to raising concerns about hazardous conditions with the 
employer is to raise them with state officials, typically with health and 
safety inspectors. We consider individual complaints first. Historically, 
individual worker complaints were the first channel of worker voice after 
protective legislation was enacted in the nineteenth century. In the early 
years of OHS regulation, complaints were often made in writing, under 
pseudonyms, to prevent employers from identifying the source.35
                                                        
33 Fudge, J., E. Tucker, and L. Vosko. 2003. “Changing Boundaries of Employment: 
Developing a New Platform for Labour Law,” Canadian Journal of Labour and 
Employment Law 10, No. 3:361-98; Cranford, C., J. Fudge, E. Tucker, and L. 
Vosko. 2005. Self-Employed Workers Organize: Law, Policy and Unions. Montreal 
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
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34 Lewchuk, W. et al., op. cit. 





present law, because of its emphasis on the development of internal 
responsibility systems, individual workers are not under a duty to report 
violations to an inspector, but only to their employer. Indeed, in the first 
years of enforcement activity under this new regime, the government’s 
desire to make the internal responsibility system work led the Ontario 
Ministry of Labour to discourage worker OHS complaints to government 
until they had gone through the internal responsibility system.36 In more 
recent years, the Ministry has shifted its priorities and has expanded its 
enforcement role. In any event, workers are legally free to make complaints 
to government and, as noted above, individual workers are protected against 
retaliation for seeking enforcement of the Act. The Act also requires 
inspectors communicate with workers. Where there are no worker 
representatives (discussed infra.), inspectors are required to “endeavour to 
consult” with a reasonable number of individual workers when conducting a 
physical workplace inspection.37
Yet the fact that workers have the right to raise OHS concerns with 
government and government inspectors have a duty to consult with workers 
when conducting inspections does not guarantee that this channel of worker 
voice will be open. As is the case with reporting hazards to employers, 
workers must be aware of the existence of the hazard and feel secure before 
they will exercise their right to report to government. David Weil and 
Amanda Pyles constructed a very useful model to explain the factors that 
influence individual reporting behaviour based on the perceived benefits 
and costs to the individual of doing so. Costs include both information costs 
(acquiring information about hazards and legal standards) and the potential 
costs of retaliation, while the benefit is improved health and safety. While 
we are strictly concerned with individuals, Weil and Pyles also note that the 
benefit of improved health and safety is likely to be a public good in the 
sense that it will benefit a larger group of workers.  This creates the 
potential for under utilization of the individual right to complain because of 
free-rider problems. Individuals may chose not to incur the costs of 
complaining in the hope that another worker who is exposed to the same 
hazard will do so.
 
38
                                                        
36 Laskin, J. K. and G. G. McKenzie. 1987. “Report on the Administration of the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act,” Ontario: Ministry of Labour; Smith, D. 2000. 
Consulted to Death. Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing. 
 
37 OHSA, cit., s. 54(4). 
38 Pyles, A., and D. Weil. 2005. “Why Complain: Complaints, Compliance, and the 
Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace,” Comparative Labor Law and 
Policy Journal 27:59-92. 
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Empirical studies of individual complaints to enforcement officials are 
scarce. Indeed, I have found only one that examines OHS complaints to 
government. Weil and Pyles’ study of complaint behaviour by US workers 
between 2001 and 2004 found that the incidence of worker complaints was 
exceedingly low - 17 complaints for every 100,000 workers. Although rates 
between industries varied considerably, there was little correlation between 
injury complaint rates, injury levels (especially among industries with high 
injury rates) and compliance rates. Industries with high injury and non-
compliance rates often had low complaint rates. 
To my knowledge there are no studies specifically examining the 
propensity of precarious workers to raise OHS concerns with government 
officials.39 However many of the same factors that inhibit workers from 
voicing OHS concerns to their employers would also be operative here. 
Precarious workers are less likely to be aware of site-specific hazards and, if 
move between different industries or occupations, of more general hazards. 
They are less likely to receive adequate training. Additionally, they are 
likely to feel more vulnerable to suffer adverse employment consequences if 
they complain and less supported in challenging retaliatory actions. Finally, 
to my knowledge, OHS inspectors in Canada have not been instructed to 





4.4. Collective Worker Voice and the State—Hazardous 
Conditions 
 
JHSCs and HSRs not only have a role to play in raising OHS concerns 
with the employer; they are also are empowered to engage with the external 
responsibility system of the state. For example, in Ontario OHSA provides 
that HSRs are entitled to accompany inspectors during their inspection visits 
on paid time. Copies of any order issued by the inspector are to be provided 
to the HSR. Where the inspector issues a stop-work order, a condition of the 
employer being able to resume the stopped work is that an HSR signs off on 
                                                        
39 Lewchuk’s study, op. cit. did not distinguish between complaints to inspectors and 
complaints to the employer, so to some extent his findings might provide some 
empirical evidence for the hypothesis that precarious workers are less likely to 
complain to OHS inspectors. 
40Australian inspectors are required to take account of temporary and agency 





a report that the employer has complied with the order.41 In Australia, five 
of nine health and safety statutes empower HSRs to issue provisional 
improvement notices and four give HSRs power to direct that dangerous 
work cease.42 These are powers reserved to state enforcement officials in 
most jurisdictions. Beyond formal statutory arrangements, HSRs also can 
play an important role in initiating complaint investigations. In an older 
study, I found that in Ontario complaint inspections disproportionately 
occurred at unionized workplaces. While in part this may be because 
unionized workers perform more hazardous work than non-unionized 
workers, it is also likely that HSRs in unionized workplaces were more 
willing to make complaints that triggered inspections than HSRs in non-
union workplaces. An American study by Weil reached a similar 
conclusion. He found that worker voice in unionized firms resulted in those 
firms being more frequently inspected, facing greater scrutiny on those 
inspections and paying higher fines if found to be in violation than non-
unionized workplaces.43
In light of what has already been said about the weakness of collective 
work voice for precarious workers in communicating with their employers, 
there is little to add regarding its role for engaging the state. Although I am 
not aware of empirical studies that examine how well collective voice 
mechanisms operate for precarious workers in attracting state protection, it 
is likely that mismatches between statutory provisions and precarious work 
arrangements, decreased ability to make effective use of JHSCs and HSRs, 
and greater vulnerability more generally conspire to undermine this channel 
of worker voice.  
 However, the union advantage should not be 
overstated in an era of growing economic insecurity for all workers. Worker 
representatives will be reluctant to complain to inspectors about hazardous 
conditions if they fear it may result in lay-offs or shutdowns. 
 
 
                                                        
41OHSA, cit., ss. 54(3), 57(7) and 57(10). 
42Johnstone, R. 2012. “Decriminalisation of Health and Safety at Work in 
Australia,” National Research Centre for OHS Regulation Working Paper No. 86, 
Canberra, Australia: National Research Centre for OHS Regulation. 
43Tucker, E. 1995. “And Defeat Goes On: An Assessment of the Third Wave of 
Health and Safety Regulation,” in Corporate Crime: Contemporary Debates, eds. 
Pearce, F., and L. Snider, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 245-67; Weil, D. 
1991. “Enforcing OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions,” Industrial Relations 30, No. 
1:20-36. 
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4.5. Individual and Collective Worker Voice—Workplace and 
State OHS Policy 
 
In this section, I am only briefly mentioning individual voice for the 
obvious reason that individual voice in respect of OHS policy is not a well 
developed channel or, for that matter, one that is likely to develop. For 
example, in Ontario employers are not legally required to consult with 
individual workers on matters of OHS policy. Of course, some employers 
may solicit individual worker involvement in OHS management, but there 
is no evidence that it happens generally, either in large establishments or in 
smaller workplaces where collective worker voice is not required and where 
researchers have found there are significant challenges to promoting 
individual employee participation.44 As well, individual worker voice in 
government OHS policy development is also not a major feature of 
contemporary OHS regulation. Certainly, individual workers are free to 
make submissions to government during consultations on regulatory and 
policy matters, but outside of occasional commissions of inquiry that hold 
local hearings government typically does not build institutional mechanisms 
to encourage or facilitate individual worker voice. Indeed, where collective 
worker voice was historically weak, such as in agriculture, and employers 
objected to permitting third-parties such as worker advocacy groups to 
speak for unorganized workers, worker voice virtually disappeared from 
government investigations.45
On the other hand, collective worker voice in OHS policy development 
at both the workplace and state level has been, to varying degrees, actively 
promoted. As we noted earlier, in contemporary OHS legislation there was 
an underlying commitment to the development of worker voice within the 
firm that did not sharply distinguish between reporting hazards and making 
recommendations for improved OHS performance. For example, in Ontario 
HSRs and JHSCs were given a mandate to make recommendations to the 
employer and later employers were required to respond to their 
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recommendations with either a timetable for implementing them or reasons 
for not implementing.46 However, there were substantial disagreements over 
the scope of worker voice. Worker activists were pressing to expand to give 
worker representatives decision-making power, but employers insisted the 
role of worker voice was only consultative. The matter came to a head in 
Ontario in the late 1980s and employers won the debate. Moreover, since 
that time, at least one survey found that senior managers in 2001 thought 
that worker involvement was less important than they did in 1990.47
Collective worker voice in the development of state OHS policy has 
long been present and has played a particularly important role in the reforms 
of the 1970s and 1980s when a militant workers’ health and safety 
movement was keeping government on the defensive.
 
Nevertheless, institutional channels for collective worker voice in 
workplace OHS management remain and may also be supported by other 
programs and policies that give employers credit for worker participation, 
such as accreditation. 
48
We have already discussed the research on the effectiveness of 
collective workplace voice in regard to hazardous conditions for both 
standard and precarious workers, but that analysis applies with equal force 
to workplace OHS policy. Indeed, it is arguable that, other things being 
equal, collective worker voice with regard to hazardous conditions is likely 
to be stronger than with regard to policy insofar as hazardous conditions are 
likely to also violate the law and therefore could be drawn to the attention of 
 The Ontario 
government responded by adopting tripartite and even bipartite institutional 
arrangements for setting OHS standards and overseeing OHS training. 
However, the high water mark of collective worker voice was reached in the 
early 1990s and was rolled back by a deeply conservative government. 
More recently, a Liberal government has been much more open to 
consultation with organized labour but has not shown any interest in 
reviving corporatist co-regulation, let alone giving workers decision-making 
powers.  
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Giving Voice to the Precariously Employed?  22 
an inspector who could issue an order. Policy matters that go beyond 
implementing regulatory requirements cannot be taken further by worker 
representatives, depriving them of an important source of power to 
influence employer decision-making.  
Finally, although there is not a large literature examining the 
effectiveness of collective worker voice in shaping state OHS policy, 
resource mobilization theory has provided some useful insights for thinking 
about the conditions under which interventions are more likely to be 
successful.49
This analytic framework has been applied to explain why a vibrant OHS 
movement successfully campaigned to reform OHS regulation from the late 
1960s to the late 1980s. It arose at a time when the Canadian state and, to a 
lesser degree, Canadian employers were still committed to a cooperative, if 
not quite a corporatist, philosophy and practice of governance. Trade union 
 First, the social structure of accumulation shapes the success 
of worker mobilizations in a variety of ways. In a context in which 
governments and employers accept trade unionism and the legitimacy of 
state protection against dysfunctional labour market outcomes, OHS 
activists are much more likely to successfully influence OHS regulation, 
especially if hazardous conditions have materialized in work-related deaths, 
injuries and diseases. As well, because of their greater employment security 
and access to institutional resources, activists will be better able to mobilize 
indigenous resources to support their campaigns. Second, the strategic 
position of particular groups of workers in the economy provides another 
important power resource. Groups of workers that can credibly threaten to 
disrupt profit-making will not only gain the ear of their employers, but also 
the state. Third, the structure of political alignments at any given time will 
also influence the power of workers to have their concerns addressed. When 
working class votes or the support of a labour friendly party is vital to 
maintaining power, mainstream parties will be more likely to accede to 
worker demands. Finally, the strategic choices made by a movement, 
including the way they frame their demands and whether that frame 
resonates with broadly shared discourses, may also significantly influence 
its success. 
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density was still relatively high and, even though the labour movement had 
an ambiguous relationship with OHS activists because their militancy 
challenged the leadership’s implicit acceptance of managerial control, the 
fact of unionization provided significant job security and access to some 
resources. The core of the health and safety movement was in mining and 
manufacturing, sectors that played an important role in Ontario’s economy 
and that could be disrupted by the actions of a militant minority. Political 
alignments were beginning to fragment as a long-serving Progressive 
Conservative government struggled to hold power, forming a minority 
government from 1975 to 1977 and then losing power to a Liberal minority 
government in 1985. Finally, the OHS movement was very effective in 
framing their demands in terms that had broad resonance. The claim that 
“Our health is not for sale” had particular traction in a country in which the 
commodification of health and health care was widely condemned.50
Collective worker voice in Ontario government OHS policy peaked in 
the early 1990s with embrace of regulatory bipartism, which saw the 
creation of labour-management structures to oversee health and safety 
training and the setting of exposure limits to hazardous substances. The 
election of a conservative government in 1995 brought that to an abrupt end 
and labour was largely excluded from policy processes until the election of 
a Liberal government in 2003.  That government created a variety of 
sectoral councils and recently established a Prevention Council on which 
four labour representatives and one non-union worker representative sit 
with four employer representatives, an independent expert and a 
representative of the compensation board.
 
51
In Alberta, there has also recently been a move to bring workers’ voices 
back into the OHS policy process. Jason Foster reports that, despite its 
relatively weak position (Alberta has the lowest union density in Canada), 
the labour movement was able to make modest gains through its 
participation in two OHS working groups established by the government to 
advise on regulatory reforms. He attributed their success to the structure of 
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the process, which required consensus, and the narrowness of the 
recommendations that emerged.52
These developments suggest that despite the weakening of the 
conditions for effective collective worker in the state, there is some scope 
for engagement in social dialogue on OHS and that modest gains can be 
made or, at the very least, hostile employer demands can be blunted. But it 
is also likely that union demands for stronger OHS regulation are likely to 
be moderated by the fear that strong state action would trigger an employer 
backlash that could potentially cost jobs.  
 
The ability of precarious workers to shape state OHS policy is even 
more limited. Not only do they face the structural constraints that all 
workers experience, but they are particularly vulnerable by virtue of their 
strategic location which limits their ability to credibly threaten to disrupt the 
economy. Their power would have to derive from associational strength, 
and that is extremely weak. Thus it is not surprising that, for the most part, 
they do not enjoy direct representation on bipartite or tripartite bodies and 
depend on the labour movement to speak on their behalf. The appointment 
of a member to represent non-union workers to the Ontario Prevention 
Council is an exception, albeit one that might indicate growing public 
awareness of the problem of precarious employment and OHS and portend 
a greater willingness on the part of the labour movement to support direct 
representation for these workers, provided that it does not come at the 
expense of the labour movement’s delegation. Moreover, there is still 
widespread rejection of the legitimacy of commodifying health and health 






The basic argument presented is that worker voice in OHS can have an 
important role to play, but only under certain conditions. Those conditions 
were present for some workers in a SER at the time when worker 
participation was legislated in the mid-1970s, but not for all. Since that 
time, those supporting conditions have become less common, particularly 
for precarious workers.  These conclusions are now widely shared among 
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researchers, so the main contribution of this section is in the distinction it 
makes between different channels of worker voice and its exploration of the 
conditions for effective voice that are particular to each channel. By 
understanding the ways in which these different channels operate, we can 
better assess where and how to address the voice deficit that particularly 





5. Worker Voice in the New World of Work 
 
What, if anything, can be done to protect and enhance worker voice in 
the new world of work? There are no simple solutions to a problem that is 
deeply rooted in structural conditions that cannot be changed in the short-
term. So clearly, there is no point in calling for a restoration of the post-war 
accord, such as it was, and the labour market arrangements and institutions 
that it supported. Although the growth of precarious employment may slow, 
as may the decline in union density, there is little reason to believe that in 
the near future either trend will be stopped, let alone reversed.53
To date, much of the literature has focused on enhancing worker voice 
in the employer’s OHS management system. For example, Walters and 
Nichols generally recommend enacting more comprehensive and stronger 
regulations requiring consultation and, for small workplaces, emulating the 
Swedish system of regional health and safety representatives.
 Given this 
challenging reality, it might be helpful to roll the discussion back one level 
by asking which channels of worker voice are most likely to be opened and 
made effective.  
54
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in the overall structure of the Ontario labour market from 1999 to 2009. 
 I will return 
to these recommendations shortly, but I want to suggest that a more 
promising channel of worker voice for precarious workers is in the area of 
state enforcement. I take this view because I think that the prospects for 
effective regulated self-regulation for precarious workers are dim and that 
54 Nichols, T. and D. Walters op. cit., 147-52. 
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despite the obstacles there is more scope for gains to be made by 
strengthening state enforcement and workers’ voices in that endeavour.  
The basis for this view is more fully developed in another paper 
critiquing new governance approaches to OHS regulation.55 Essentially, I 
argue there that OHS regulation is beset by regulatory dilemmas that arise 
because of conflicts between safety and profit. Of course safety and profit 
do not always conflict and compliance strategies are most likely to succeed 
in its absence.  But conflict is common and when it is regulatory dilemmas 
will limit the space for cooperation, except under certain conditions.  Erik 
Olin Wright has argued that mutually beneficial class compromise is 
sometimes possible, but only when workers have sufficient organizational 
and political strength to take OHS out of competition by requiring all 
employers to maintain high standards.56 Historically this situation has been 
difficult to achieve, and perhaps was best realized in the Nordic countries 
during the 1970s and 80s.57
The turn toward worker voice in enforcement has been most apparent in 
recent writing on the enforcement of employment standards, where scholars 
have identified substantial compliance deficits.
 However, under conditions of globalized 
production and weakened worker organization, employers have retreated 
from cooperative arrangements.  As a result, a primary focus on building 
self-regulation with worker voice risks a regression toward neo-liberal 
regulation that valorizes market-driven outcomes. 
58
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 Since people working at 
the bottom of the labour market are almost by definition precariously 
employed, researchers writing in this vein have had to confront the new 
realities of the labour market more starkly than those writing about OHS, 
where a greater variety of workplace situations are found and where the 
SER still exists in some places. Moreover, for precarious workers, 
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enhancing voice in an internal responsibility system for ensuring 
compliance with applicable employment standards is not a sensible policy 
response. In most workplaces there is no institutionalized internal 
responsibility system that workers can access. Therefore, public regulation 
and enforcement must be prominent in any regulatory strategy and worker 
voice in enforcement is a component of a multi-pronged approach to its 
improvement.59
Jennifer Gordon and Janice Fine have been particularly helpful in 
focusing attention on the role of worker voice in public enforcement.
 
60
Their proposal partially resembles the Swedish regional safety 
representative model discussed earlier insofar as it introduces a third party 
into the workplace to facilitate worker voice, but it differs in at least two 
important ways. First and foremost, the focus of their proposal is not to give 
 They 
understand that a major problem facing vulnerable workers is that they 
confront numerous barriers to exercising individual voice by making 
complaints either to their employers or to state regulators even though they 
are legally protected against employer retaliation for doing so. Moreover, 
direct collective voice is unlikely since these workers are overwhelmingly 
unorganized and are unlikely to gain union representation in the near future. 
Therefore, Fine and Gordon focus on third-party or community-based 
enforcement, which draws upon the resources of third-party worker 
representatives, like unions and workers’ centres, to gather and provide 
information to inspectors and to file complaints. Based on a number of case 
studies of innovative enforcement programs in the United States, Fine and 
Gordon argue that for these arrangements to be successful, they must be 
formalized, sustained, vigorous and well-resourced.  
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“Improving Workplace Conditions through Strategic Enforcement,” Report to the 
Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf (accessed 29 January 
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industry and supply chain structures to identify powerful actors and tools to motivate 
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workers voice in the firm’s internal responsibility system, but rather to open 
up communication between workers and state enforcement officials. As 
well, the Swedish scheme only allows regional health and safety 
representatives to access unionized firms. The system works to the extent 
that union coverage is the norm and worker participation is accepted. But 
even in Sweden, the continued effectiveness of this approach is in doubt. 
Changes in the Swedish industrial relations system and the structure of its 
labour market, including the growth of more precarious forms of 
employment are undermining regional safety representation.61
Of course, opening this channel of worker voice is not an easy row to 
hoe either. It requires collective workplace agents or institutions with both 
the commitment and resources to undertake this role, and state 
cooperation.
 In a North 
American context, where private sector union coverage is very low 
generally, and likely to be minimal where large numbers of vulnerable 
workers are employed, and the idea that workers are entitled to a voice in 
workplace decision-making is alien, it is extremely unlikely that the 
Swedish model would succeed. For these reasons, Fine and Gordon 
properly focus on a community-based model that aims to enhance worker 
voice in public enforcement, independent of union membership. 
62 There are some jurisdictions in which trade unions 
historically have played an active role in enforcing employment and health 
and safety standards. For example, in Australia, under the awards system, 
unions took the lead in ensuring that employers complied with standards.  
To fulfil this role, they enjoyed a right of access to workplaces, the power to 
inspect relevant documentation and standing in court to seek recovery of 
wages and penalties for breaches.63
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62 On the importance of labour market institutions, see Weil, D. 2005. “Individual 
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Australia, authorized union representatives have the right to investigate 
suspected OHS offences and this has led to about 20 private prosecutions.64
Historically, trade unions in Ontario played a similar although less 
extensive role under the Industrial Standards Act (ISA), prior to its repeal.  
They sat on Advisory Committees, which were established in part to 
monitor employer compliance with applicable schedules. However, these 
committees lacked formal enforcement powers.
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Outside of the niches where the ISA applied, union resources were spent 
servicing their bargaining units, not enforcing decrees or sectoral 
agreements. However, recently, some unions are showing increased interest 
in assisting unorganized precarious workers without first becoming their 
certified bargaining agents. For example, the United Food and Commercial 
Workers have not only tried to unionize agricultural workers, but have 
supported the creation of ten support centres across Canada that provide 
advice and assistance on a variety of employment related matters. The 
Alberta Federation of Labour has also been active in providing support 
services for temporary foreign workers through its Advocate program.
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A second candidate to fulfil the institutional role of enhancing worker 
voice in enforcement is worker centres. These centres have been growing in 
the United States and Canada. Fine discusses a number of examples where 
worker centres that established formal partnerships with government to 
enforce minimum standards laws. They have been able to do this in part by 
framing their claims in moral terms that resonate with widely shared values 
and in part by working in communities with large immigrant populations 
concentrated in particular industries.
 
How much support unions can or will provide remains to be seen, especially 
at a time when union densities are falling.  
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To my knowledge, workers’ centres in Canada have not established 
formal roles in enforcement, despite some successes influencing public 
policy and obtaining commitments from the government to increase their 
enforcement efforts, particularly for vulnerable workers.68
A third candidate is legal and occupational health and safety clinics. 
Although to my knowledge there is no history of clinics playing such a role, 
there is an existing institutional infrastructure that could be developed to 
involve them in enforcement. On the legal side, there is the Workers’ Health 
and Safety Legal Clinic in Toronto, Ontario, that is funded by Legal Aid 
Ontario. Its mandate is to provide legal services to non-unionized workers 
who have health and safety concerns. As well, there is a network of 
occupational health and safety clinics across the province of Ontario that 
provide OHS services to workers. Because their current focus is primarily to 
identify OHS hazards and provide information to workers, employers and 
the public, enhancing worker voice in enforcement might be seen as 
counter-productive, but it may be possible to build on this institution.
 In Toronto, for 
example, the Workers’ Action Centre has been an effective advocate for 
temporary agency and other vulnerable workers.   
69
Whether these or other institutions to enhance workers’ collective voice 
in OHS enforcement can be developed is an open question. With the 
exception of protections against non-payment of wage, workers obtained 
OHS regulation before other minimum standards, for the reason that it was 
widely perceived as unjust for workers to be exposed to excessively 
hazardous conditions. The OHS movement of the 1970s and 1980s was very 
successful in framing their claims in moral terms that rejected the 
legitimacy of commodifying workers’ health.
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 As we noted, in the 
regulatory regimes that were created in the late twentieth century, worker 
voice was emphasized, but it was primarily located in the internal 
responsibility system, which was to be the principal site for improving OHS 
management and securing compliance with OHS standards. Since that time, 
there has been a shift in Ontario away from a compliance approach that 
emphasizes the promotion of self-regulation through the internal 
responsibility system toward direct enforcement of state standards. 
Expanding the role of worker voice in regulatory enforcement would be 
69 Toronto Workers’ Health and Safety Legal Clinic, online http://www.workers-
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consistent with this change of emphasis. Moreover, it might also be possible 
to argue that community-based enforcement, at least in selected areas where 
conventional inspection systems are particularly weak, would increase state 
capacity at relatively low cost. 
Is this possible? There is a window of opportunity in Ontario. On 
Christmas Eve 2009, four migrant workers died when the scaffold they were 
working on collapsed. In the aftermath, the Ontario government appointed 
an expert advisory panel, chaired by Tony Dean. Among the eleven priority 
recommendations in the Dean report was to establish a special committee 
under s. 21 of the OHSA to provide the Minister of Labour with advice on 
the protection of vulnerable workers.71 Unfortunately, as of the time of 
writing, the committee has not yet been struck, but the government remains 
committed to carrying out this recommendation and it may provide some 
space within which to promote new and experimental approaches to 
enforcement for this group. In August 2012 the Law Commission of Ontario 
issued its Interim Report on Vulnerable Workers, which made a number of 
recommendations to address the problems vulnerable workers face. In 
particular, it recommended that the government identify the sectors where 
vulnerable workers are concentrated (agriculture, hospitality and cleaning, 
workplaces with temporary agency staffing) and prioritize them for 
proactive inspection. As well, it recommended that temporary foreign 
workers in all sectors be a priority. It did not, however, make any 
recommendations for enhancing worker voice in OHS enforcement, 
although it did suggest making provision for third-party complaints with 
respect to employment standards violations.72
In conclusion, we can only speculate about the contribution that voice 
might make to the protection of vulnerable workers from hazardous 
working conditions. We know that under certain conditions voice can be an 
important component of an effective system of OHS regulation. We also 
know that the changing political economy is undermining the conditions for 
worker participation at the firm level and the capacity and commitment of 
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states to directly regulate of hazardous working conditions. In these 
circumstances, probably the most that can be done is to identify multiple 
pressure points on governments and firms and to enhance the channels of 
worker voice where and whenever it is possible to do so. Worker voice 
rights, whether in the workplace, the state or intermediate institutions, have 
never been granted without struggle. In this context, pressuring government 
to provide workers a stronger voice in pubic OHS enforcement is a strategy 
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